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Lessons Learned

 

 

Document Name Comments Detailed Comments Date Doe Facility
Working without a lockout/tagout when required has placed workers at risk
 
  On February 2, 2005, a new electrician accidentally grounded a wire with his pliers while changing out lights and ballasts, tripping a main circuit breaker and causing a power outage that lasted two hours. The journeyman electrician was not shocked by the 277-volt circuit. 3/2005 Nevada Support Facility
Document Name Comments Detailed Comments Date Doe Facility
Improperly removed lockout/tagouts have created hazardous conditions

 

  On April 5, 2004, demolition workers removed two locks and three tags that were still applied to electrical equipment in a facility undergoing D&D. The workers were performing electrical strip out of the facility and removed the lockout/tagout equipment without authorization. The facility was isolated from incoming electrical power by air gapping all wires. Workers were still required to wear appropriate personal protective equipment for electrical work and verify zero voltage conditions before removing equipment. 3/2005 Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site
Document Name Comments Detailed Comments Date Doe Facility
Work Packages that inadequately defined lockout/tagouts have placed workers at risk
 
  On November 1, 2004, mechanics were tasked with replacing the heads on two air compressors. Two red locks and tags were placed on the electrical supply to the compressors and a cross connect valve was opened to provide air from a backup air compressor. As the mechanics began bleeding down the air system, low pressure alarms occurred on the main air system indicating a leak and failure of the mechanics to close and lockout an isolation valve as required by the work package. 3/2005 Los Alamos National Laboratory
Document Name Comments Detailed Comments Date Doe Facility
Improperly applied lockout/tagouts have created hazardous conditions    On January 27, 2005, during a liquid transfer operation, some of the liquid was inadvertently transferred to the wrong tank. Operators re-verified the position of system valves and discovered one valve that was locked as required but was not closed, resulting in an inadvertent transfer. 3/2005 Savannah River Site F-Canyon

 

 

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Safety of Accelerator Facilities Committee website
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May 2007 Electrical Safety Month @ SLAC
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EM Safety Alerts 2005-02
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(UL) November '05 issue of Code Authority
How Can I Tell if the UL Listing Mark is Counterfeit?


Mitigation for Halogenated Cable Types 
Fiber-Guard®/LSZH™ Low Smoke Zero Halogen
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



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